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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
misrepresentation is not necessary to render the dealing objectionable. Fail-
ure to indicate clearly the true nature of the article is sufficient.'s Secondly,
trade-mark infringement must be avoided. The purchaser must not be led
to believe that he is dealing with the product or the agent of the company
indicated by the trade-mark. 19 Otherwise business might be diverted from
the holder of the trade-mark.20 Moreover, the reputation of the product
might be harmed, because a used article, even if repaired, may well have
"'lost much of its original character and excellence."'21 Trade-marks should
be removed or obliterated if possible.22 If, for the express purpose of pre-
venting remaking and resale without infringement, a manufacturer places
the trade-mark in such a position as to make its removal impossible, the
courts seem inclined to bar him from equitable relief.23  J. M. F.
WILLS-NET INCOME ARISING DURING ADMINIsTRATION-RIGHTS OF LIu
TENANTS AND REMAINDERMN-[District of Columbia].--Testator, after
providing for payment of debts, specific devises, and legacies, devised and
bequeathed to defendant all the residue of his estate, in trust, to divide into
equal shares and to pay the net income therefrom to named beneficiaries,
with remainder over. Held, that $23,000, which accrued on certain securi-
ties later sold to pay the debts, legacies, and costs, was to be added to the
residuary fund as part of its corpus.'
14. Stipulation No. 508 (1929) 13 Fed. Trade Comm. Rep. 440.
15. Federal Trade Comm. v. Korb and Dwyer (1922) 4 Fed. Trade Comm.
Rep. 418.
16. Federal Trade Comm. v. Premier Electric Co. (1923) 5 Fed. Trade
Comm. Rep. 385.
17. Federal Trade Comm. v. Jones, Paul, Ironclad Tire Co., et al. (1919)
1 Fed. Trade Comm. Rep. 380.
18. See cases cited supra, notes 8 to 17.
19. (1905) 33 Stat. 728 (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 96; Prest-o-lite Co. v.
Bournonville (1915) 260 Fed. 442 (refilling and resale of acetylene gas
tanks bearing original trade marks); General Electric Co. v. Re-New Lamp
Co. (C. C. D. Mass. 1904) 128 Fed. 154.
20. Buick Motor Co. v. Buick Used Car Exch. (1928) 132 Misc. 158,
229 N. Y. S. 219; Dodge Bros. v. East (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1925) 8 F. (2d)
872, 875.
21. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1936) 16
F. Supp. 816; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Reich (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1938)
24 F. Supp. 945.
22. In the Emener case (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 816, the
court ordered that the trade-mark be removed, the word "used" be indented
in the metal shell, and the shell and the bushing nut be covered with a
distinguishing red paint. The Reich case (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1938) 24 F.
Supp. 945 stated that removal of the trade mark was not necessary if im-
possible without damage to the article and if sufficient care was taken to
give notice to the purchaser.
23. General Electric Co. v. Re-New Lamp Co. (C. C. D. Mass. 1903)
121 Fed. 164; General Electric Co. v. Re-New Lamp Co. (C. C. D. Mass.
1904) 128 Fed. 154.
1. Proctor v. American Security & Trust Co. (App. D. C. 1938) 98 F
<2d) 599.
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Though this seems to be the majority rule,2 another line of decisions
holds that such income should be paid to the life beneficiary. 3 The majority
rule proceeds on the theory that such income as accrued from the property
later sold to pay the debts, legacies, and costs was not a part of the residue
at the time of the testator's death, and the life beneficiary is therefore not
entitled to such sum as net income from the residue.' This view would
seem to be the more logical since by judicial definition "residue is what
remains after payment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of administra-
tion, and legacies."5 The minority rule proceeds on the basis that the life
beneficiary is the first and immediate object of testator's bounty and that
testator did not intend the trust fund to be swelled at the expense of the
life beneficiary.6 This view would seem to be more in keeping with the
probable intent of the testator.
In the first American case, decided in New York in 1837, 7 the court
after reviewing the English authorities stated: "In the bequest of a life
estate in a residuary fund, where no time is prescribed in the will for the
commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of the use or income of
such residue, the legatee for life is entitled to the interest or income of the
clear residue as afterwards ascertained to be computed from the time of
death of the testator." It is noteworthy that New York has since changed
this rule by statute,8 so that such income now goes to the life beneficiary.
Though perhaps less logical, this may yet be the more desirable result.
Any favor between the life beneficiary and the remainderman should be
shown the former in view of the fact that he is more likely to have been
closer to the testator than was the remainderman. B. S.
2. Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Fowler (1925) 102 Conn. 318, 128 Atl. 719;
Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent (1917) 11 Del. Ch. 334, 101 Atl. 875; Grainger's
Ex'rs & Trustees v. Pennebaker (1933) 247 Ky. 324, 56 S. W. (2d) 1007;
York v. Md. Trust Co. (1926) 150 Md. 354, 133 Atl. 128, 46 A. L. R. 231;
Estey v. Commerce Trust Co. (1933) 333 Mo. 977, 64 S. W. (2d) 608;
White v. Chaplin (1929) 84 N. H. 208, 148 Atl. 21; Restatement, Trusts
(1935) sec. 234, comment g; 2 Perry, Trusts (7th ed. 1929) 938-940, secs.
550-551.
3. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith (1929) 266 Mass. 500, 165 N. E. 657;
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Jones (1936) 210 N. C. 339, 186 S. E.
335, 105 A. L. R. 1189; City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Taylor (1933)
53 R. 1. 126, 163 Atl. 734, (1933) 13 Boston U. L. Rev. 385. See also, on
the related problem of the allocation of a stock dividend between life tenant
and remainderman, Comment (1928) 13 ST. Louis LAW REvIEw 223; In re
Nichols Trust Fund (1934) 228 Mo. App. 489, 68 S. W. (2d) 917; Selleck
v. Hawley (1933) 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S. W. (2d) 387; Lynn v. Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. (Mo. 1925) 274 S. W. 825.
4. Proctor v. American Security & Trust Co. (App. D. C. 1938) 98 F.
(2d) 599; see also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith (1929) 266 Mass. 500,
165 N. E. 657.
5. In re Mahlstedt's Will (Surr. Ct. 1931) 140 Misc. 245, 250 N. Y. S.
628; Addeman v. Rice (1898) 19 R. 1. 30, 31 Atl. 429.
6. Lovering v. Minot (1851) 9 Cush. (Mass.) 151; City Bk. Farmers'
Trust Co. v. Taylor (1933) 53 R. I. 126, 163 Atl. 784.
7. Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige 298.
8. N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1931-35 supp.) c. 42, sec. 17b. See Sur-
rogate Foley's praise of the statute, quoted in City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Taylor (1933) 53 R. I. 126, 134, 163 Atl. 734, 737.
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